13.4.11

In Defence of a Biblical Ethic


1.0   In Response to the question as to why the biblical witness of ethics ought to be consulted at all, let alone be made the foundation for a societal ethic, one may respond in a number of ways:

      1.1   First, regardless of our point of view, we must consult some standard or measure for an ethic, no matter what that standard might be. In other words, we can either throw our lot in with the concept of a Biblical God, or with Kant, Mill, or any other notable ethicist. The counter then may be raised, why should we consult any of those others as well? Mightn’t it be more useful simply to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each system?
      1.2   As any undergraduate taking an ethics class could tell you, each of the major ethics wrestling for allegiance have their inherent disadvantages. Kant’s system, for example, manages on some level to maintain a consistent ethic derived purely from reason, but then fails to find any measure of flexibility in difficult situations. Most people feel like they *should* be able to lie under certain circumstances, for instance, and that it would be even ethically noble for them to do so when faced with a particular situation. This is something Kant doesn’t really give us. Or at least, depending on your reading of Kant, he doesn’t seem to attempt to give us with any consistency. Then there is Mill and other Utilitarians who give us a consequence driven ethic, which on its head seems decent, until you think about unintended consequences, or the unforeseeable nature of some actions. Not only this, but utilitarianism by itself seems to condone certain actions we would like to find immoral, such as the subjugation or enslavement of a minority group. Aristotelian virtue ethics manages to account for the concept of character and virtues as being a middle road between two extreme vices (ie, the concept that goodness is often an act of moderation). Virtue ethics fall short, however, when consulted for a particular problematic instance—in other words, it’s not a very prescriptive ethic.
     1.3   Add to this the base assumption made by most ethicists: That humans will feel the need to do what is best for society and / or be consistent in their personal ethic. Why should I not simply take of the banner of Nietzsche in the face of a Kantian deontological onslaught and say simply that as long as I am willing to power I am in the right? Why not have an ethic of “immorality”? What is the basis of a Kantian ethic? The general goodness of humanity? Let us not deceive ourselves into believing that others will be good for its own sake. Kant tries to fix this by phrasing his categorical imperative as a selfish act, though at its core it is really simply the golden rule: “Do unto others...”But even that is hardly original and finds its basis not in a deontological ethic founded in reason, but in biblical ethicism! The concept of universality is clever, but is really just an extension of this idea.
      1.4   Virtue ethics on the other hand require there to exist an objective standard of virtue outside of ourselves which we must adhere to, which is fine, but why stop there? Why not simply adopt a more complete ethic that appeals to an objective truth?


2.0  The Concept of God is an important one in dealing with these matters. Regardless of where you want to stand on the ontological status of divinity, one must at least concede the point that the notion of a biblical God is perhaps the best possible foundation for an ethic. Without a personal, omnipotent God of both mercy and judgment, any ethic we can devise will have no real weight to it, and we will inevitably fall into Nietzsche and Sartre. So at the very least, the point can be made that the idea of a biblical God is the lynch-pin of any working ethic, and is therefore a necessary being. It can also be noted that if we are looking for the best possible foundation for morality, while we can use any notion of God that metaphysicians can devise, we cannot achieve one which is even equal in this purpose to the biblical God. Certainly, we may use the notion of Zeus to instill morality into a society, or even pantheistic notion of divinity, but nothing will be quite so effective as the Lord Almighty.
      2.1   As such then it seems perfectly reasonable (if not necessary) to start with the Judeo-Christian notion of God in forming an ethic. In holding this, we have a number of advantages: We have a system that defines clearly right and wrong, that is consistent, and yet is also situationally flexible. We have an ultimate source to appeal to that is outside of ourselves for determining morality and does not require us to reason within ourselves. We also gain an ethic which really utilizes the best of all three of the other major schools of ethical thought within a consistent worldview. 
      2.2   Perhaps the largest weaknesses of a biblical view is that our understanding of the law at times does require difficult interpretations. This is not always an easy task and often leads to hours of meditation on a specific passage before one can formulate a moral judgment, though ultimately there is a moral judgment to make.


3.0  At Their Foundation, All Moral Judgments are a Dichotomy. In other words, all morality is actually black or white, good or bad, at its core. This is not to say that there is no such thing as a grey area when it comes to our perception, just simply that from a grand-scheme view, things are either right or wrong.
      3.1   Regardless of how complicated a particular moral judgment may be, I think it is right that most people would wish to affirm that there is, actually, a “right” decision that can be made, and if there is a “right” decision, or even right decisions, it is perfectly acceptable to say that any decisions that do not fit in the category of right, are in actuality, wrong. A gradient does not work when looking from what we might cheekily term a “God’s-eye view.”
      3.2   As such then, it is Wisdom which allows us to cut through the “greyness” and perceive the right from the wrong. It is our job then, as people who wish to be ethical, to do whatever we may to attain more wisdom so as to be able to more accurately divine the rightness or wrongness hiding behind ever more and more difficult moral judgments.
      3.3  This Wisdom is related to but not equal with Knowledge. One may say that knowledge informs wisdom. Knowledge is the working capital of the intellect. The aim then is to acquire as much knowledge as possible with which to use to inform one’s wisdom. Wisdom, I will lean upon our biblical ethic to define. Simply put, wisdom is the “Fear of the Lord”(Ps 111:10; Pr 1:7, 9:10 provides a decent notion of this, and can be informed by Colossians and 1 Corinthians 1 as well as a myriad of other places throughout the Bible). In a societal ethic, this can and may play out in an actual sense of fear (fear of judgment, fear of divine holiness, etc.), but in a personal sense need not, and indeed should not stop there. Since we are using the notion of a Biblical God as the basis for a societal ethic, however, our primary concern is the first sense.
     3.4   A guiding principle can be seen that the greater the fear of the Lord, the greater the trajectory of wisdom, and the greater the knowledge, the more informed and potentially powerful the wisdom can be in cutting away the fat of “grey areas” from the lean judgment of the matter. One of the main reasons, practically speaking, to seek and attain wisdom is to become a more proficient and discerning ethicist. This certainly fits with the biblical model, and also fits nicely into the understanding of wisdom held by our favourite Greek friends of the Socratic school.
      3.5   It should also be seen that this does not undermine the use of other previously mentioned ethical systems. Those systems may be viewed through the lens of wisdom as knowledge both useful and empowering. Being consistent then, one may appeal to such ethics only in as much as they support the biblical model. The notion of Wisdom is the guiding principle through which knowledge is understood, viewed, and interpreted, and is therefore reinforced by this lens. Note also that this is a presupposition we are purposefully choosing to use when approaching knowledge, in recognition of the fact that one cannot completely remove presuppositions. We choose this particular presupposition, because (as seen above) the biblical ethic is the best possible choice with which to approach ethics with the goal being an holistic, workable system.
      3.6  Another thought that should be mentioned here is that to be wise is to be ethical. This is not often how we perceive wisdom today. We tend to think of intellect, cunning, and wisdom as under the same umbrella. Let us turn our perceptions, then: the wisdom of someone’s worldview and philosophy should be judged first and foremost upon their ethic (both lived and held). If someone’s lived ethic does not match up with their held ethic, one should have series qualms about their wisdom. Similarly, if someone’s ethic, either held or lived, does not match up with a consistent biblical ethic, that ethic may need to be viewed as the utter rubbish.

3 comments:

Heirron said...

Hi! I'd have to say that this all looks quite good and interesting! Very interesting to read, and I just wish I were more versed in the relevant literature.

At any rate, here are a couple of thoughts. I hope they're useful!

I suspect you already know these things (you've studied more Kant than I have), but I'll mention anyway that on Kant's view, it can begin to look like there can't be bad action, and like Aristotelianism, it's very difficult to get any substantive directives out of the categorical or hypothetical imperatives (which don't make them very practically useful).

In 1.3, you mention that universalization is an extension of Biblical ethics, but I think an opponent of the view could say that even if it is an extension, it is superior in being more all-encompassing.

For 1.4, I'm really not familiar with virtue ethics, but it seems odd to suppose that objective values might be false, and if they're true, then one is appealing to objective truth. Anyway, perhaps it's obvious having read the relevant literature, but I at least would benefit from a brief summary of the key points in relation to this discussion.

In 2.0 (similarly to 1.4) I wonder what Nietzsche and Sartre fall into and how.
Also, perhaps I just missed it, but I didn't see how you made your "lynch-pin" point. While, naturally, I agree with you, I am afraid that from a non-Christian perspective, appealing to a "non-philosophical" text like the Bible will appear ad hoc without a convincing presentation, especially since the claim is a strong one.

With regard to 3.0, and just out of curiosity, what would you do with someone who chooses Campbell's chicken soup over their tomato soup? Or even one can of chicken soup over another one? Would you want to classify these as right or wrong in some sense? Are some mundane actions like these a-moral, perhaps being permissible because they don't contradict what makes for a good action? Anyway, as I said, I was just curious.

But yeah, I thought it was quite interesting to read. Keep up the good work. :)

Aaron

denaje said...

In response to both Heirron's last point and Evan's article,

I agree with the question, what do you do about a judgment that is seemingly amoral? You could, for instance, say that the decision to choose chicken soup over tomato soup is amoral, but given chaos theory and the fact that every particle in the universe is interconnected, you cannot do something that doesn't ultimately affect people. Does this mean that every decision, however seemingly insignificant, becomes a moral judgment? And if so, how do you determine what is right and what is wrong without omnipotence?

I may also argue, what about a moral situation that can only be described as a gradient of choices, each choice a degree more moral than the last, none of which is able to work for the good of all involved? (Simple example...Batman choosing to save Rachel or Dent, knowing he'd be the only one to succeed?) Would you say that only the most moral choice is "right" and all others are "wrong"; only the least moral choice is "wrong" and all others are "right"; or do you draw the line somewhere in the middle? What if you can't tell which choice is the most moral, especially if it is not informed directly or indirectly by God?

What leads me to my last question. What do you do in the face of a seemingly moral choice that is in no way informed by the Bible? Do you deny that such a moral situation is possible, or would you fall to another ethic to handle it?

Ok I'm done now.

Heirron said...

Evan, I just came across something very interesting in an article I am reading that I think pertains to sections 1.1 - 1.4.

The article is, "On Acting Rationally against One's Best Judgment," and Nomy Arplay distinguishes between the Rational Agent's Manual approach rationality, which tells an agent when particular actions are rational, and the Account of Rationality approach, which just says when people do or do not act rationally. She then points out that on the Account of Rationality approach, it may be no fault of the theory at all if, in a particular instance, it fails to give helpful advice (it will include instructions like, "don't act out of self-deception"), but that if Rational Agent's Manual fails to give good advice, it is necessarily a failing of the theory.

The point of all this is that she says the same distinction can be made in ethics. So if an Account of Morality theory isn't helpful in a particular situation, it may very well not be the fault of the theory. Just as a matter of completeness, a Kantian or virtue ethicist could probably respond in this kind of way, saying they're giving an account rather than a manual, and while both are perfectly valid, they should not be held to the same evaluative standards.

Arplay says, "For an ethics-related discussion of the relation between accounts and manuals, see Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 137-71."